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ABSTRACT 
Quality Control sampling plans are normally chosen by using 
industrial and military standards. These standards do not 
involve economic considerations, and usually fail to meet cost 
considerations. 
The Information Economic approach presented in this paper 
suggests an easy to use methodology which determines the optimal 
plan for a given situation of a quality control Common 
quality control attributes like, AQL, LTPD, Operating 
Characteristics Curves and Quality Control Plans are shown as 
special cases of Information Economic Models. Theorems involving 
dominance among various of Quality Control plans are proved. The 
Blackwell Theorem on the relationship "Generally More 
Informativew is modified to accommodate to the Quality Control 
case. 
The major results of the paper include new algorithm to optimize 
the expected utility of decision makers. The value of 
information in Quality Control systems is assessed, and 
cost/effective analysis is carried out. 
Key Words: 
Quality Control, Information Economics, Value of Information, 
Informativeness 
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1. ~ntroduction 
The purpose of Quality Control activities is to provide assurance 
that goods or services conform to specific standards [Monks, 
1982, Ch.141. The Quality Control process is one of the most 
important activities in manufacturing as well as in service 
organizations, 
During the last ten years, it was proved that adequate use of 
Quality Control (hereafter - Q.C.) tools can save incredible 
amounts of resources [Kaplan, 19831. L 
Common Q.C. practices such as MIL STD 105D [Duncan, 19651, do not 
account for the costs of the Q.C. process and sometimes it might 
yield to waste of resources. 
By applying the Information Economic model [McGuire, 19721 to 
Q.C. we shall be able to answer the following questions: 
1) What is the normative value of the information provided 
by a Q.C. sample? 
2) Are there Q.C. plans that predominate other plans? 
3) How can one determine the optimal Q. C. plan for a given 
situation? 
Section 2 of this paper reviews the Information Structure Model 
which will later be modified to solve the problems mentioned 
above. 
In sectionr 3 we define the Q,C. system as ~r qpecial case of the 
Information Economic Model. 
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Section 4 ranks order Information Structures of sample Q.C. plans 
in a "Generally More InformativeN order. 
Section 5 shows the relationship between the Operating 
Characteristics Curves and the Information Structures of plans. 
Section 6 derives theorems on the "generally more Informative" 
relationship of Information Structures. 
Section 7 defines the wuniversally Generally More Informativew 
order and shows that such an order does not exist in Q.C. plans. 
6 
In section 8 we discuss the special and useful case of 2x2 
Information Structures, and prove some theorems regarding this 
case. 
Section 9 derives the relationship between a sample matrix and a 
plan matrix. 
Section 10 shows the relationship between the informativeness of 
a sample and the sample size. 
Section 11 proposes a normative process of maximizing the value 
of information in Q.C. problems. 
Section 12 draws the conclusions. 
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2. The Information Structure Model: A Review. 
This section briefly reviews the Information Structures Model. 
For further details the reader is referred to [McGuire 1972], or 
Let E be a finite set of events (states) of nature 
E = { el, ..., 
 en^ 1 
a 
Let If be the vector of a priori probabilities associated with the 
events in E. 
Where t represents the transpose operation. 
Let Z be a finite set of signals 
Z = { Z1, ...I Znz 1 
An Information Structure or Information Matrix Q is an n~ x nz 
Markov (stochastic) matrix of the conditional probabilities in 
which signals of the set Z will be displayed at the occurrence of 
events in E. Thus, qij of Q is the probability that for a given 
event ei, signal Zj will be displayed. (If Q contains only 1 or 
0 elements, then it is a noiseless structure). 
Let A be a finite set of feasible actions to be taken by the 
decision maker 
A = { all ...,  an^ 1 
A cardinal payoff function, U, is defined from A x E to the real 
numbers, R, associating payoffs to pairs of actions and events, 
The function U can be depicted by an nA x nE matrix, U, whose 
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elements reflect the payoff gained under any combination of 
action ai of A an event ej of E. 
The decision maker does not observe the events, but only the 
signals, and chooses actions according to signals he or she 
observes, The decision maker's strategy can be described by an 
nz x n~ Markov Matrix D, which contains the probabilities of 
taking some actions after being stimulated by some signals. 
Thus, dij of D is the probability that for a given signal Zit 
L 
action aj will be taken. (If D contains only 1 or 0 elements, 
then D is a pure strategy). 
A 
Let3 be a square matrix containing the elements of in its main 
diagonal, and zeros elsewhere 
C 
Then the expected payoff of the combination of an information 
structure, Q, a decision rule (strategy) D, a payoff matrix U, 
A 
and a probabilities vector 3 would be ~~(QDUZ), where tr 
represents the trace operator [McGuire 19721, Optimization is 
reached by finding a Markov matrix D* out of all possible nz x n~ 
Markov matrices to maximize tr ( ) .  
Let us define 
lli A 
F(Q, U, h )  = max {~~(QDuT)} 
Let us define the relationship 
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QA ) QB (QB is not better than QA regarding U andT) if 
QA is regarded as generally more informative than QB (denote 
QA)/QB ) if QB is not better than QA for all payoff matrices U and 
all probability vectors . 
The Blackwell Theorem (McGuire 1972) states that QA ) QB if and 
only if QAWQBt where L is a Markov matrix with the appropriate 
dimensions. This ordering is only a partial ordering of the set 
of finite information structures operating on a given-tate-of- 
the world set. 
The gross value of information is always a relative number 
comparing the expected payoff gained by using different 
information structures. 
For example, assuming that the utility is a linear function of 
the payoff, and QA is not better than QB, then the value of the 
L II 
information of QA over QB is F(QA,U,b) - F(QBtUt 4) with an 
appropriate calibration. 
There are few extensions and applications of the Information 
Structure Model presented by McGuire [McGuire, 19721. 
For instance, Ahituv [Ahituv, 19811 introduced some behavioristic 
aspects into McGuirefs model. His assumption was that 
individuals often tend to stick to rigid decision rules, 
particulary when they are trained to respond with conditioned 
reactions. Optimizing the expected utility according to the 
"Rigid Decision Rulew yields rank ordering of Information 
Structures different from the Blackwell Theorem. 
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3. Oualitv Control Systems as Information Structures 
Examples of Quality Control problems using the Information 
Structure model were demonstrated by Wallock and Adams [Wallock 
and Adams, 19631 and Demski [Demski, 19721. Further research 
held by Moskowitz and Berry suggested a method to find an optimal 
sample [Moskowitz and Berry, 19761. This paper suggests a 
complete methodology for selection and comparison of Q.C. plans. 
This complete methodology was not done so far, using the 
(I 
Information Economic models. 
This paper applies Information Economic methodology to Quality 
Control problems, and uses it to improve the selection of Q.C. 
plans. In order to do so, we first define some of the Q.C. 
basics, and the fundamentals of our terminology. 
Definition 3.1 - Samwle Plan: Decision rule which specifies how 
large a sample (n) should be and the maximum allowable 
measurement number, or percentage (c) of defectives in the 
sample. (Monks, 1982, ch. 14). A plan is therefore specified by 
(n, C) 
For example, the plan ( 5 0 , 2 )  reads as follows: Select a random 
sample of 50 units and count the number of defectives. If the 
number of defectives is equal to or lower than 2, accept the lot; 
otherwise reject it. 
Note: in this work we will deal with attribute plans, where items 
are inspected dichotomically such as good or bad, acceptable or 
not acceptable (for further details see [Duncan, 19651). 
An attribute plan of n units can display n+l different results 
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(hereafter called signals) which correspond to the possible 
numbers of defectives identified by the inspection, i. e. , 
0,1,2,...n defectives. 
Thus, a Q.C.  plan can be regarded as an Information Structure 
whose domain is the real quality of a lot, and whose range is a 
set of n+l signals. We will now formulate this in a more 
rigorous definition, 
Definition 3.2 - Information Matrix of a Sam~le A M is defined as 
an Information Matrix of an n size sample if it is a Markov 
matrix as follows: 
(3-2.1) M = { mij i=ll *..I "E 
j=ll ,.., n+l 
(3.2.2) The number of rows is equal to number of states of nature 
which are the possible ratios of defective items, i.e., 
E={ Plr . . . I  PnE ) 
(3.2.3) The of columns -is equal to the number of signals, which 
are the possible amounts of defective items in the sample 
y = O,l, ... ,n 
Thus M is a n~ x n+l matrix as follows: 
y=O, y=1, ..., y=n 
p1 I I 
I I 
M = I 1 
P n ~  I I 
(3.2.4) mij = Pr(y=j-l/P=Pi) i=l, . . . , nE 
j=l, ..., n 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-87-08 
For convenience, the states of nature will be arranged in an 
ascending order, so that 
PI < P2 < ... < PnE 
This sorting will not change the generality of the problem (see 
Example 3.1 
Let M be a sample matrix representing a 3 item sample and 
suppose there are two possible states of nature: 
Assuming that the failure probability is Binomial [Duncan, 19651 
the information system of this sample, M, is 
y=O y=l y=2 y=3 
I I 
M = P0=0.02 1 .9412 .0576 .0012 0 I 
I I 
P1=0.05 1 .8574 ,1354 .0071 ,00011 
I I 
for example, mil was calculated by using the Binomial 
distribution - 
Po and P1 can normally represent AQL and LTPD levels of quality, 
as defined below: 
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Definition 3.3: AOL (Accewted Oualitv Levell is "the quality 
level of a "goodw lot. It is the percentage of defectives that 
can be considered satisfactory as a process average and 
represents a level of quality which the producer wants accepted 
with a high probability of acceptancew [Monks, 1982, ch.141. 
Po can be chosen as the desired AQL. 
Definition 3.4: LTPD (Lot Tolerance Percent Defective) is **the 
quality level of a '*badw lot. It represents a level of quality 
which the consumer wants accepted with a low probability of 
acceptanceN [Monks, 1982, ch.141. 
P1 can be the desired LTPD. 
Definition 3.5 - Information Matrix of a Q.C Plan: 
An n~ x 2 Markov matrix whose rows represent states of nature Pi, 
i=l, . . . , n~ and the columns are the aggregated signals y \( c 
and y > c (where c is the acceptance number, 0 4 c  5 n; n is the 
sample size) is called the Information Matrix of a Q.C Plan, 
The element of an Information ~atrix are: 
qil = Pr[y c/P=Pi] i = I, . . . ,  "E 
qi2 = Pr[y>c/P=Pi] i = 1, . , . ,  n~ 
Example 3.2 
We will now show an Information Structure of a Q.C plan having 2 
states of nature: AQL and LTPD. 
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The matrix represents the relations between the states of nature 
and the signals; in this example, a lot having a percentage of 
defects equal to AQL is considered a "goodw lot, and a lot having 
P = LTPD defectives is considered a "badw lot. 
This presentation enables us to elaborate on two more Q.C terms: 
Definition 3.6 - Producer's Risk (ao: 
&= Pr(reject a lot / the lot is "goodtg) 
d.= Pr( y>c / P=AQL ) , 
where y is the number of defectives. 
Definition 3.7 - Consumer's Risk (A) :  
p = Pr(do not reject a lot / the lot is "badg1) 
p = Pr ( y+ / P=LTPD) 
Thus, the presentation in example 3.2 enables us to present all 
the elements of a Q. C plan (AQL, LTPD, n, c, .(, and P ) in a 
single matrix by relying on the Information Economics (IE) 
approach. 
It is obvious to show that every Q.C plan can be presented as an 
Information Structure. 
Definition 3.8 - Decision Matrix of a Sam~le: D will be a 
decision matrix of an n item sample if it is an n+l x 2 Markov 
matrix that associates signals with decisions. 
The signals are the number of defectives (y=O through y=n) and 
the decisions are "acceptw or "rejectw a whole lot. 
Example 3.3 
Assume a 5 item sample; one of the feasible decision matrices is 
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Accept Reject 
y=o I 1 0 I 
y=l ( 1 0 I 
y=2 I 1 0 I 
D = y=3 I 0 I 1 
y=4 I 0 1 I 
y=5 I 0 1 I 
The strategy presented in this matrix is - "take a 5 item sample, 
accept the lot if the number of defectives is tw6 or less; 
otherwise - reject ittt. This matrix is , in fact equivalent to 
the plan (5,2) . 
Definition 3.9 - Decision Matrix of a Plan: 
D will be called a "Decision Matrix of a Q.C Planw if it is a 2x2 
Markov matrix that associates aggregated signals with decisions. 
The signals are : 
y e  and y>c 
The decisions are : 
"accept the whole lot88 and "reject the whole lotN. 
Example 3.4 
The matrix of example 3.3 , corresponding to the plan (5,2) can 
be also presented as the following decision matrix 
88Acceptw "Rej ectIt 
Y$c I 1 0 I 
D = I I 
Y>C I 0 1 I 
Note that some strategies are not needed to be considered in the 
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first place. For instance, strategies that always accept or 
reject the lot. Undoubtedly, this case would not require 
information system (a sample), since the decision is never 
affected by any of the signals. 
Strategies for which dij = { 0.1 } are labelled Itpure 
strategies1*. When at least one of the elements is neither one 
nor zero, the strategy is called a "mixed strategyw. 
Definition 3.10 - Prior Probabilitv Vector: 
The prior probability vector is a vector , 
whose elements are the prior probabilities of the n ] ~  states of 
nature, P1, . . . , PnE, (where P1 < P2 < . . . < P,E). 
Note: is defined for both matrices - plan and sample. 
Definition 3.11 - The Payoff Matrix: 
The Payoff Matrix U is an 2xnE matrix whose each element uki 
displays the payoff related to a decision k ("acceptw or 
"rejectw) and an occurrence of state of nature i. 
Note: The payoffs can be expressed in terms of costs, that are 
estimated by the decision maker or derived from historical data 
stored in the information system of the organization. Some 
corporations which have adopted the "Quality Costsw concepts 
[Sullivan, 19831 can construct the payoff matrix almost 
immediately by extracting data from this data base. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-87-08 
15 
Example 3.5 
Suppose a "goodw lot is considered a lot having 2% defectives, 
and a "badw lot is one having 5% defectives. 
Suppose the a-priori probabilities of those states of nature are: 
T t  = (.9 .l) 
The payoff matrix is: 
"goodtt lot "badtt lot 
Accept lot I 0 -1,000 1 
U = I I 
Reject lot 1 -100 O I 
Two Q.C plans are considered: 
A = (158,4) and B = (184,5). 
Assuming that the testing costs are equal for the two plans, 
which one is preferred? 
Solution: 
Let QA and QB be the Information Matrices for plans A and B 
respectively. According to section 3: 
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The optimal decision rule for QA and QB turns out to be 
and the expected payoffs are 
A 
max {~~(RDu')} = -28.9 
and 
max {tr(QDU$)} = -25.3 
It is seen that under these particular circumstances plan B 
(represented by Q) is more informative than A, and, therefore, 
preferred.Suppose plan A was in use, then the switch over to plan 
B improves the performance by 
-25.3 - (-28.9) = 3.6 
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4. Rankina 0.C Plans in a ttGenerallv More Informativew Order 
Let QA and QB be the Information Matrices of plans A and B 
respectively. QA will be generally more informative than QB if 
there exists a Markov matrix R that satisfies the equation 
(4.1) QB '=: QAL 
This is a result of the Blackwell Theorem [McGuire,1972]. 
Exam~le 4.1 
Suppose the following two Q.C plans are given: 
A = (32,l) 
B = (200,7) 
The states of nature are: 
AQL = .02 
LTPD = .08 
The Information Structures will be: 
1 .87 .13 1 
QA = I 1 
1 .26 .74 1 
1 .95 .05 1 
QB = 1 I 
1 .08 .92 1 
B is generally more informative than A because there exists L, 
1 -91 .09 1 
L = I I 
1 .21 .79 1 
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that satisfies (4.1) . 
This will imply that the expected value of the payoffs gained by 
using plan B will never be less than those obtained by plan A, 
regardless of the values of the payoff matrix and the a-priori 
probabilities. Thus, plan B dominates plan A. 
In real life situations, we usually make incoming inspection on 
items that are intended for several users to be used in different 
projects. Thus, payoff matrices cannot be easily assessed. 
Having one plan that dominates the other, regardless of the 
payoff matrix, helps in selecting the right plan. In addition, 
sometimes we test a "brand newt1 item, for which it is very 
difficult to estimate the prior probability vector. Choosing a 
plan that is not dominated by any other plan assures that the 
test results and payoffs are not inferior to outcomes that could 
have been obtained by another plan, even if the expected payoff 
is not accurately computed due to fuzzy a-priori probabilities. 
5. O~eratins Characteristic Curves and Information Structures of 
Plans 
An Operating Characteristic Curve (hereafter OCC) is a curve that 
shows, for a given plan, the probability of acceptance versus the 
percent of defective parts in the lot [Monks, 1982, ch.141. 
Figure 5.1 shows an OCC of the plan (200,7). 
Insert Figure 5.1 about here. 
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One can derive many Information Structures from a given OCC, 
depending on the states of nature selected. For example, for the 
following states of nature 
AQL = 2% 
LTPD = 8% 
The 1.S of (200,7) will be 
1.95 .051 
QA= I I 
1.08 .921 
If we choose 
AQL = 1% 
LTPD = 5% 
we will get another I.S., QB as follows: 
1.9967 .00331 
QB= I I 
1.0896 .91041 
The components of QA and QB can be derived from figure 6.1 or can 
be calculated directly. 
Theorem 5.1 
(a) For a given Q.C plan (n,c) and a given set of states of 
nature there exists only one 1,s. 
(b) For a given set of states of nature different from P=O and 
P=l, there is one to one relationship between a Q.C plan and an 
OCC. 
Proof 
(a) It can be seen directly that we draw the OCC by using the 
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same calculations that we derive the corresponding I.S. and 
therefore the formal proof is considered trivial. 
(b) The same argument can apply here. We leave the formal proof 
to the reader. 
Thus, we have shown that our terminology and methodology can not 
only incorporate terms as AQL, LTPD, o(, and p ,  but also the 
Operating Characteristics Curves. Those relationship will enable 
us to show in the next section the informatineness of d . ~  plans. 
6. Some Theorems On "Generally More Informativew Of 0.C Plans. 
We would like now to identify the conditions that turn a certain 
Q.c plan (nltcl) to be generally more informative than another 
one (n2,c2). 
Definition 6.1: Generally More Informative Order of Q-C Plans: 
Plan (nl,cl) will be called generally more informative than plan 
(n2, c2) for a given set of states of nature (pl, . . . , PnE) I when 
the Q.C plan matrix corresponding to (nl,cl) is generally more 
informative than the matrix corresponding to (n2,c2). 
The following theorem will compare the informativeness of two Q.C 
plans having the same sample size (n) or the same acceptance 
number (n) : 
Theorem 6.1 
Let (nl,cl) and (nl,c2) be two Q.C plans, based on the same 
sample size (nl). Neither of the two plans can be considered 
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generally more informative than the other one, for all sets of 
states of nature. 
Proof: 
Let A = (nl,c2) and B = (nl,cl) be two Q.C plans such that c2 cl. 
Graphically, the OCC of plan A will always be above the OCC of 
plan B [Juran and Gryna, 19801. Figure 7.1 shows that 
relationship. 
Insert Fig. 6.1 about here I 
Now we will choose randomly two states of nature P1 and P2. Let 
QA and QB be the plan matrices for A and B. Assume P1 and P2 are 
the states of nature pertaining to this case. 
Since c2>cl and A is drawn above B 
and 
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Thus, the plan A cannot be generally more informative than B, and 
vice versa, according to the Blackwell Theorem. 
Theorem 6.2 
Let (nl,cl) and (n2,cl) be two Q.C plans having the same 
acceptance number (cl) . Neither of the two plans can be 
considered generally more informative than the other for all sets 
of states of nature. 
The proof follows the same sequence of reasoning as in the 
previous theorem. L 
Theorem 6.3 
Let (nl,cl) and (n2,c2) be two Q.C plans such that nl)/n2 and 
~ 1 4 ~ 2  Neither of the two plans can be generally more 
informative than the other one for all sets of states of nature. 
The proof is similar to the one in Theorem 6.1 
Corollar~ 
For any given Q.C plans (nl,cl) and (n2,c2), a necessary 
condition that (nl,cl) will be generally more informative than 
the other plan is 
.IS,, and c1>3c2. 
For example, if we have to coose between the following plans: 
A = (250,5) 
B = (300,4) 
there is no way that for any given set of states of nature one 
plan will be generally more informative than the other, since the 
conditions stated above (n3n2 and c17/cZ) do not exist. 
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7. "Universallv Generally More Inf~rmative~~ Order of 0.C plans 
So far we have discussed the informativeness of an Information 
structure for a given set of states of nature. The question is 
whether there might be an order (defined hereafter as 
lsUniversally Generally More Informativett) that enables us to say 
that a certain plan is always more informative than the other, 
regardless of the prior probabilities and the states of nature. 
In other words, is it conceivable that a certain plan (nl,cl) is 
generally more informative than another plan (n2,c2i) for 
states of nature? We will call this order "Universally Generally 
More Informativew order. 
Definition 7.1 
Q. C plan (nl, cl) is called ttUniversally Generally More 
Informativew than (n2,c2) if plan (nl,cl) is generally more 
informative than plan (n2,c2) for everv given set of states of 
nature. 
We will show now that such a relationship cannot exist. 
Theorem 7.1 
Let (nl,cl) and (n2,c2) be Q.C plans. (nl,cl) can never be 
unversally generally more informative than (n2,c2) and vice 
versa. 
Proof 
The relationship between (nl,cl) and (n2,c2) can be as follows: 
(a) OCC of (nl,cll is always above that of (n2.c2). 
In this case, according to Theorems 6.1 and 6.2, the relationship 
of "Generally More Informativett does not hold. 
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(b) OCCs of (nl.cll_ and (n2.c21_ intersect in the open interval 
(0,l). 
Figure 7.1 portrays this situation . 
................................................................ 
Insert Figure 7.1 about here. 
For the states of nature bounded by the interval [el,e2], the OCC 
of (n1,cl) will always be above that of (n2,c2), thefrefore (as 
implied by part (a) of this theorem) the order of universally 
generally more informative cannot apply. The same argument 
disables the states of nature bounded by [rl,r2],to be 
universally generally more informative. Since one can always 
find two states of nature that are in those intervals, the 
relationship of Universally Generally More Informative does not 
hold. 
Q.E.D 
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8. Dominance of 0 . C  Plans Havinq Two States of Nature. 
The most common use of Q.C plans is in the case of two states of 
nature: AQL and LTPD [Duncan,1965]. The conditions for one Q.C 
plan to be generally more informative than the other one is 
provided in the following theorem. 
Theorem 8.1 
Let Q and R be two information structures of Q.C plans operating 
on a common set of states of nature (AQL and LTPD). Let qij and 
). 
rij be the elements of those matrices, R is generally more 
informative than Q if and only if 
rll 911 and I21 \( 921 
Proof 
According to the Blackwell Theorem (McGuire, 1972), QA is 
generally more informative than QB if and only if there exists a 
Markov matrix L that satisfies 
QAL = QB 
thus, 
I  SAll l-q~ll I I 111 1-111 1 I  9B11 l-qB11 I  
I I I I = I  I  
1 9 ~ 2 1  l-9~21 I  1 121 1'121 1 I qB2l l-qB2l I 
Solving those equations yields 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-87-08 
26 
based on the properties of a Q.C plan, q ~ l l  9~21, and q ~ l l  9 ~ 2 1  
(since the states of nature are arranged in a descending order). 
Thus, it is easy to show that the conditions 
9 ~ 1 1  > q ~ l l  and 9 ~ 2 1  $9~21 
yield 
q 1 1 1 e  and 0Fl12$lr 
which means that L can be presented as a Markov matrix, and the 
Blackwell Theorem is in effect. 
Q.E.D 
Interpretations of Theorem 8.1 
Theorem 8.1 can be interpreted in two ways: 
a Interpretation bv **error tvpesl* considerations. 
The matrices Q and R can be rewritten as 
where g B ,  O(~A are the **producer's risk1* of plans Qg ana QA 
respectively (or statistically speaking, they are the errors of 
type 1) 
The condition qA1l>&B1l yields thataqA<%B, which means that the 
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"producer's riskw in QA plan is less than the one in QB plan. 
The second condition (qAZleB2 implies that the ltcustomert s 
riskw of plan QA is smaller than the one of plan QB. Thus, QA is 
generally more informative than QB, if and only if both the 
wproducer's riskw and the "customer's riskw of QA are less than 
those of QB. Thus plan QA will always yield a greater expected 
payoff value than QB, regardless of the prior probabilities or 
the payoff matrix. 
2) ~nter~retation by OCC I 
The graphical interpretation of Theorem 8.1 is shown in Fig. 8.1 
............................................................... 
Insert Figure 8.1 about here 
The relationship of generally more informative between QA and QB 
occurs if two conditions are satisfied: 
(a) The two corresponding 0CC8s must intersect. 
(b) The point of intersection is between the values of AQL 
and LTPD. 
Result: The relationship of Generally More Informative order can 
exist only if there are two states of nature. 
Whenever there exist three or more states of nature, it can be 
shown that either two or three states are on one side of the 
intersection, thus by Theorem 8.1 they cannot be rank ordered 
under the relationship generally more informative. 
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9. The Relationshiw Between a Samwle Matrix and a Plan Matrix 
In the previous sections we have defined two different 
Information Structures: An Information Structure of a Sample (a 
Sample Matrix) and an Information Structure of a Plan (a Plan 
Matrix). In this section we will show and prove the relationship 
between those matrix. 
Theorem 9.1 
Let E = {el, ...,  en^ ) be a given set of states of nature. Let 
item matrix, and let 
structure of the plan (n.c); both matrices are defined on the 
same set of states of nature. Then, there exists a matrix D such 
that 
Q = MD 
and D is an nE+2 matrix, D = {dij) 
dij = 
Proof 
By definition, Q is an n~ x 2 matrix, and M is an n~ x (n+l) 
matrix. Therefore, any D that satisfies the equation 
Q = MD 
must be an (n+l) x 2 matrix. 
The general element of M (the sample matrix) is 
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The general element of Q is 
c n 
qil = Pr( y e  / P'Pi) =r y ~ i ~ * ( l - ~ i ) n - ~  
y=o 
changing the indeces e=y+l yields 
and 
and therefore D (as designated above) satisfies 
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Results 
1. D is the Decision Matrix of the Sample Matrix M, and will look 
like the following structure: 
Accept Reject 
y=o I 1 0 I 
I  1 0 I 
I  1 0 I 
y=c I 1 0 I 
y=c+l I 0 1 I 
I 0 1 I 
I 0 1 I 
y=n I  o 1 I 
2. Every Q.C plan matrix can be presented as a multiplication of 
a sample matrix and a decision matrix. A Q.C plan aggregates the 
signals (y) into two groups : y@ and y>c. We saw now that this 
aggregation was done by multiplying the sample matrix (M) with 
the decision matrix (D) . 
3. THis theorem covers also the two degenerated strategies: 
I1Accept AlwaysM and "Reject Alwaysl1. Those strategies can be 
presented by appropriate decision matrices. For instance, the 
"Accept Alwaysm strategy can be presented by the following 
Decision matrix: 
I 1  0 1  
I *  * I  
I *  * I  
I 1  0 1  
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10. The Informativeness of a Q.C Sam~le and the sam~le Size 
Is an n+l sample lot generally more informative than an n sample 
lot? Intuitively, the bigger the lot is, the more information we 
get. But, according to Theorem 10.1, certain Q . a  plan matrices 
can be derived from the same sample matrix. Thus, should the 
expected payoff that we can get from the optimal plan derived 
from the n+l sample will yield a better expected payoff? 
For example, assume that we have a 100 item sample, Assume also 
that for a given payoff matrix and given prior probabi'lities the 
optimal plan is (100,7). Will a 101 item sample yield more 
information? Should the Q.C plan (101,7) be better than (100,7)? 
Should (101,6), (101,8), or (101,7) yield better expected payoff 
than (100,7)? 
The next theorem will show that an n+l item sample is always 
generally more informative than an n item sample, and the optimal 
plan derived from it - (for a given situation) will yield an 
expected payoff not smaller than the maximal expected payoff 
derived from an n size sample, 
Theorem 10.1 
An Information Structure of an n+l size sample is generally more 
informative than an Information Structure of an n size sample. 
Proof 
Let E be a set of states of nature 
E = {  el, ...,  en^ 
and Mn+l be an information matrix of an n+l item sample defined 
on E. Let Mn be an information matrix of an n item sample 
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defined on E. According to the Blackwell Theorem [McGuire, 19721 
M,+~ will be generally more informative than Mn if and only if 
there exists a Markov Matrix R that satisfies 
Mn = Mn+l*R 
Where R is an (n+2) x(n+l) Markovian matrix. 
Using the Bayes Theorem it can be shown that the general element 
of R, r i j  is 
j = 1 for every j , so R is a Markov matrix. 
Q.E.D 
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11. A Normative Process of Maximizins the Value of Information 
in Q.C Problems. 
We will devise now the normative process to maximize the value of 
the information provided by a Q.C plan. We will show how to 
choose the most appropriate plan: 
11.1 S t e ~  1 - Effectiveness of Sam~linq 
11.1.1 Choose appropriate n ] ~  states of nature (as a default, 
k 
unless otherwise specified, determine n~ = 2, where Po = AQL and 
P1 =: LTPD) , 
11,1.2 Assess payoff matrix U. 
11.1.3 Check whether ~ ~ 1 6 ~ ~ ~ .  If u l l ~ 2 1  - do no sample. 
Reject the lot. End. 
11.1.4 Check if u ~ ~ ~ $ u ~ ~ ~ *  If true - do not sample, 
Accept the lot. End. 
11.2 S t e ~  2 - Determininu the lot size 
11.2.1 Determine prior probabilities for all states of nature. 
11.2.2 ~etermine function for the cost of testing the sample. 
f = f (n) 
where f is a non-decreasing monothonic function of the sample 
size. 
11.2.3 Determine the value of the maximal expected payoff 
without sampling (EMVmax). 
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11.2.4 Calculate the Expected Value of Perfect Information (EVPI, 
see [Raiffa, 19681) by subtracting the Emmax from the Expected 
Profit with Perfect Information (EPWPI, see [Raiffa, 19681). 
EVPI = EPWPI - EMVmaX 
11.2.6 Find the maximal value of n (n=n*) that solves the 
I 
equation 
n* is the upper bound for the sample size. 
11.2.7 To find the optimal sample size optimize 
MAX {tr( MntDU) - f (nf)) Q$l% n* 
nf,D 
where Mnr is an n size sample matrix over the given states of 
nature. 
Optimization can be obtained by exercising several searching 
methods (i.e., Fibonacci, see [Avriel, 1976, Ch.81). 
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12. Conclusions 
In this paper we have dealt with the normative value of 
information derived from Q.C sampling. 
The major results and contribution of this paper can be 
summarized as follows: 
1. Information Economic model was applied to Q.C. problems 
providing a complete and closed application to the theory 
developed. A full terminology was defined to fit Q.C. problems 
into the model. Terms as Structures of Plans and Samples, 
Decision Matrix of Q.C, Plans and Samples, Payoff Matrix and 
Prior Vector were defined and analyzed, All the existing terms 
(e.g., AQL, LTPD, OCC etc.) can be identified and used in the 
proposed terminology. 
2. The new terminology enables simply and clearly to apply a 
Baysian approach to the Q.C. problem, Thus it is convenient to 
incorporate costs considerations into sampling. 
3. An easy to use algorithm for determining the optimal sample 
size is proposed. 
4. The methods and terminology defined in the paper enables to 
assess in a quick way the value of information derived by any 
sampling in any given situations. 
5, The theorems on the dominance of one sampling plan over the 
other (in a generally more informative order) may lead to better 
and more cost effective sampling. 
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2 DEFECTIVE 
FIGURE 5.1: 
OPERATING C W C T E R I S T I C  CURVE OF PLAN (200, 7)  
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FIGURE 8.1 
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